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FEASIBILITY CLAIMS IN THE DEBATE OVER ANARCHY 
VERSUS THE MINIMAL STATE 
BRAD R. TAYLOR* 
1. Introduction 
Feasibility is a concept often invoked but rarely defined in political 
argument. We hear claims such as “Your ideas are good in principle, but 
wouldn’t work in practice” or “Sure, but that’s never going to happen,” but 
the precise content of such claims is often unclear. Feasibility or practicality is 
obviously important and must in some sense be a hard constraint on political 
argument if political argument is meant to serve a practical purpose. It does 
not matter how good the proposed solution would be; the fact of infeasibility 
acts as a trump card removing any need for a balancing of feasibility against 
desirability. We need not entertain impossible ideas, even really good ones.  
The idea of feasibility as a constraint on institutions and policy has 
played an important role in the argument for libertarian institutions. 
Buchanan’s (1984) characterization of public choice theory as “politics 
without romance” and Munger’s (2014) gentle mocking of “unicorn 
governance” have been powerful responses to those putting excessive faith in 
the willingness and ability of government to solve social problems. It may be 
possible to imagine an ideal set of policies through which a wise and 
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benevolent dictator can produce a desirable result, but any real-world 
proposal relying on such assumptions is rightly dismissed as infeasible.  
Feasibility arguments have also divided libertarian scholars. Anarchists 
and minarchists routinely accuse each other of making utopian arguments. I 
here consider these disagreements in light of the philosophical literature on 
political feasibility with the aim of both clarifying the points of disagreement 
in the debate on anarchy versus limited government and interrogating the 
role of feasibility considerations in political argument. I suggest that 
anarchists and minarchists often talk past each other because they are 
adopting different concepts of feasibility without clearly specifying their 
meaning. The dispute here is not merely a verbal one, but the argument turns 
on a variety of positive and normative questions that are often masked by 
loose talk about feasibility. This has lessons for the concept of feasibility 
more generally. The diversity of feasibility claims we see in political argument 
is too great to be captured by a single formulation, despite what recent work 
in political philosophy has attempted. I suggest that the concept of feasibility 
should be disaggregated using the method of elimination, and I show how 
this helps structure political argument and reveals sources of disagreement.  
2. Feasibility in Political Theory  
Political theorists have traditionally drawn a sharp distinction between 
questions of desirability and feasibility, roughly how good something would 
be if brought about versus how realistic it is to expect it could be brought 
about (Raikka 1998). For the most part, what precisely we mean by 
“feasibility” has been ignored, but a number of analytic political philosophers 
have recently become interested in the concept and sought to provide some 
conceptual clarity. Brennan and Southwood (2007, 10) consider a feasible 
action to be one with a “reasonable probability of success conditional upon 
trying.” Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012, 4) see feasibility as a four-place 
predicate: “It is feasible for X to φ to bring about O in Z,” with X being 
some agent, φ being some action, O being some outcome, and Z being some 
context. Wiens (2015) provides a vision of feasibility as a generalization of the 
familiar production possibility frontier from economics.1  
Although these accounts differ in detail, they are united by an attempt 
to construct a general formulation of the concept of feasibility. It is this 
project I reject. I instead argue that the concept of feasibility should be 
                                                          
1 See also Brennan (2013), Lawford-Smith (2013b, 2013a), Southwood and Wiens 
(2016), and Wiens (2013).  
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disaggregated rather than clarified as a singular concept in political argument. 
In similar spirit, Hamlin (2017) considers the extant philosophical literature 
on feasibility and finds four distinct types of feasibility claim not easily 
reduced to a simple formulation. I am in basic agreement with Hamlin’s 
analysis but take his argument a step further. Whereas Hamlin provides a 
more nuanced conceptualization of feasibility, I suggest that political 
argument would proceed more smoothly if we were willing to give up the 
term “feasibility” (and related terms such as “realistic,” “practical,” and 
“utopian”) altogether and instead say what we mean using more precise 
causal or counterfactual language. I lay out this method of elimination in 
section 6. 
Consider the Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012) formulation of 
feasibility outlined above, for example. If this formulation is to capture the 
variety of feasibility claims we see in political argument, each predicate will be 
able to take on wildly different sorts of value. As I will show below, some but 
not all feasibility claims are agent relative, meaning that agent X will 
sometimes be undefined or at least defined rather vaguely. Actions φ can be 
made by individuals, but to fit many feasibility claims into this schema we 
would also need to include policies and policy proposals into this 
formulation. Outcomes can also be quite different, ranging from political and 
policy outcomes to social and economic ones. Considering all the dimensions 
along which feasibility claims can vary, I contend, a general formulation of 
feasibility that helps rather than hinders political argument is, if not strictly 
impossible, at least infeasible. 
3. Feasibility Claims in the Anarchy vs. Minimal-State Debate  
As a case study in feasibility claims made in political argument, I 
examine the debate between free market anarchists and small-government 
libertarians. This is a useful case study for two reasons. First, within these 
debates there is a reasonably strong (although not perfect) agreement on 
desirability, meaning that disagreements are primarily grounded in feasibility 
issues. Secondly, there is a rich source of written material, from academic 
journals and books to magazines and blog posts. This frequent back and 
forth provides a solid data source. 
Anarchists claim we should have no state at all (e.g., D. Friedman 1989; 
Rothbard 1973; Stringham 2015); minarchists claim that we should have a 
minimal state restricted to a few basic functions (e.g., Buchanan 1975; M. 
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Friedman 1962; Nozick 1974; Rand 1964).2 Both anarchists and minarchists 
have accused their opponents of being utopian (i.e., advocating the 
infeasible). In this section, I outline these feasibility arguments. I make no 
attempt to evaluate the arguments; the purpose is simply to tease out what 
exactly is being claimed when the concept of feasibility is deployed. My aim 
here is to sample the arguments made by a few influential libertarian scholars 
rather than conduct a comprehensive review of the literature.  
4. Anarchy as Utopian 
Any (outcome-sensitive) libertarian anarchist will presumably accept the 
following propositions: 
(i) If implemented and maintained, the “policy outcome” of 
statelessness is sufficiently likely to produce a situation in 
which individual rights are respected.  
(ii) If implemented, the policy outcome of statelessness is 
sufficiently likely be maintained (i.e., it is stable).  
(iii) Statelessness can be implemented.  
Each of these propositions can be disputed on feasibility grounds. 
Someone philosophically opposed to libertarian anarchism could deny that 
anarchism is desirable even while endorsing (i)–(iii) as true, because they do 
not consider the (factually undisputed) outcomes of statelessness preferable 
to the relevant alternatives.3 This is not a feasibility claim, but rather a 
desirability claim. A minarchist could also endorse (i)–(iii) as true but reject 
anarchism on the grounds that they see a minimal state as more desirable 
than orderly anarchy. This is likewise not a feasibility claim, since such claims 
must in some sense take desirability as given. In broad terms, we might say 
that any argument against (i), (ii), or (iii) is a feasibility argument.  
                                                          
2 Minimal-government libertarians differ a great deal in terms of just what the state 
can legitimately do. Nozick and Rand restrict the minimal state to a basic law-and-order 
function, while others such as Buchanan and Hayek allow for the production of public 
goods and even some basic redistribution. Since I am here interested in feasibility 
concerns, I set aside these differences in this paper.  
3 Someone concerned with social justice or moral purity, for example, might accept 
completely the economic argument that anarchy promotes efficiency or liberty but deny 
that this makes anarchy more desirable than the relevant alternatives because anarchy 
produces distributional patterns or allows behaviour that their nonlibertarian value system 
deems undesirable (and sufficiently so to outweigh any positive weight given to efficiency 
or liberty). 
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There will of course be differences of opinion on the level of likelihood 
required to meet conditions (i) and (ii). Two libertarians might agree on the 
desirability of orderly anarchy and on the probability of anarchy becoming 
disorderly or producing a de facto state while disagreeing on whether such a 
gamble is worth the risk. Such a disagreement would come down to risk 
preference, and this is an issue of desirability rather than feasibility. The 
method of elimination endorsed here can be used to tease out which 
disagreements are due to differences in probability judgements and which are 
due to differences in risk preference. The statement “Anarchy would be good 
if orderly, but it is too risky” is vague and can be made more precise by 
eliminating the term “too risky.” For the statement to be taken seriously, 
some probability judgment and probability standard must be specified.4 If 
thus reformulated, the statement would be made more precise and argument 
could focus on the real grounds of disagreement; if not, the statement can be 
conditionally rejected as meaningless until it is reformulated in more precise 
terms.  
Each of these propositions has been attacked by non-anarchist 
libertarians. We can classify these arguments as (a) policy-effect arguments 
(those rejecting [i]); (b) policy-stability arguments (those rejecting [ii]); and (c) 
political-accessibility arguments (those rejecting [iii]). Below I discuss 
prominent examples from each category.  
a) Policy effect 
Anarchists argue that voluntary transactions will secure an acceptable 
level of social order and liberty. This claim has, to put it mildly, received a 
good deal of criticism, even among fairly radical libertarians. The criticism I 
am interested in here is the claim that anarchism, if realized (in the sense that 
anarchists have their way and the state ceases to exist), would produce, with 
certainty or with unacceptably high probability, violence and disorder. I take 
this to be a feasibility argument in the sense that it claims a political outcome 
would not produce the social outcome intended by its advocates. In political 
theory, the idea is normally traced to Hobbes; among libertarians and classical 
liberals, Ayn Rand and James M. Buchanan hold variants of this view. 
                                                          
4 These need not be precise point estimates or standards. For example, the claim 
“Anarchy would certainly be too risky if there were a 5 percent chance of disorder, and 
although I am not confident of the exact probability I am confident it is greater than 5 
percent” would be a meaningful statement that would allow productive argument on both 
the estimate and the threshold. 
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Rand (1964, ch. 14) argues that anarchy is incapable of protecting 
individual rights. She gives two reasons for this view. First, lacking a 
centralized coercive power, individuals would be vulnerable to the whims of 
nasty people. Rand (1964, 104) concludes that “if a society left the retaliatory 
use of force in the hands of individual citizens, it would degenerate into mob 
rule, lynch law and an endless series of bloody private feuds or vendettas.” 
Second, decentralized enforcement is inconsistent with the enforcement of 
“objective law”: “Even a society whose every member were fully rational and 
faultlessly moral, could not function in a state of anarchy; it is the need of 
objective laws and of an arbiter for honest disagreements among men that 
necessitates the establishment of a government” (Rand 1964, 107).  
There are two feasibility claims here: 
Rand’s Hobbesian social undesirability: Anarchy would lead to 
constant violence and rights violations. Thus, the anarchist’s 
proposed policy of statelessness is an infeasible means of securing 
the desired social outcome of liberty.5  
Rand’s imperfect liberty: There is no possible way for the 
anarchist’s policy proposal to perfectly achieve the desired social 
outcome of respect for libertarian rights.  
Buchanan’s argument against anarchism is more developed than Rand’s 
and more explicitly based on the Hobbesian state of nature and feasibility 
concerns. Buchanan (1975, 5) endorses anarchism as a philosophical doctrine: 
“To the individualist, the ideal or utopian world is necessarily anarchistic in 
some basic philosophical sense.” Although the utopian anarchist vision of 
everybody respecting each other’s rights is appealing, Buchanan sees it as a 
“conceptual mirage” since absent a unanimously agreed set of rights, there 
can be no perfect respect for those rights. This argument is similar to Rand’s 
“imperfect liberty” argument, but Buchanan is not willing to hold up 
objective law as a meaningful standard of comparison. Buchanan’s point is 
simply that utopian (i.e., conflict-free) anarchy is a logical impossibility as 
long as there is some disagreement over the assignment of rights and the 
boundaries of individual autonomy. Rand treats this as an argument for 
government because she believes there is an objective law that the 
government ought to enforce; Buchanan makes no such claim and sees 
                                                          
5 It is not entirely clear whether Rand thinks the Hobbesian outcome is a certainty or 
merely very likely. Her use of terms such as “cannot” and “would” suggests the former, 
but interpretation is complicated by the fact that Rand reacted to criticisms of her 
argument against anarchy by cancelling the critic’s subscription to the Objectivist rather 
than responding to the arguments (see Stringham 2007, 6–7). 
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disagreement over rights as a problem that does not disappear with the 
emergence of a state. The comparison is, as always, between two imperfect 
alternatives (Buchanan 1984; Demsetz 1969). 
Buchanan does, however, argue that disagreement in anarchy would 
produce disorder for basically Hobbesian reasons: without external 
enforcement mechanisms, individuals would have incentives for predation 
rather than production, and this makes everybody worse off (Brennan and 
Buchanan 1985, ch. 1; Buchanan 1975, ch. 2; Buchanan 2005). Thus, 
according to Buchanan, the anarchist’s claim that statelessness produces high 
levels of social order is mistaken. Although philosophically appealing on 
classical liberal grounds, it is unrealistic to expect anarchy to be orderly.  
Buchanan’s Hobbesian social undesirability: Anarchy would 
lead to constant conflict and little cooperation. Thus the anarchist’s 
proposed policy of statelessness would not produce the desired 
social outcome of Pareto nondominance by government.  
b) Policy instability  
Others have argued that although the Hobbesian view is overly 
pessimistic, libertarian anarchy would endogenously lead to the re-emergence 
of the state.6 Cowen (1992, 268), for example, argues that “libertarian anarchy 
is not a stable equilibrium.” Cowen accepts for the sake of argument that the 
Hobbesian jungle can be avoided through cooperation among competing 
protection agencies but claims that this ability to cooperate will itself lead to 
the emergence of a de facto state.7 Similarly, Holcombe (2004, 326) argues 
that government is “unnecessary but inevitable” on the grounds that 
                                                          
6 This view is sometimes attributed to Nozick (1974), though that is not quite 
correct. Nozick argued that a minimal state could emerge through voluntary interaction 
and used this as a normative justification for the minimal state. This does not imply that 
actual anarchy would lead to the re-emergence of the state. 
7 See also Cowen and Sutter (1999). Cowen’s argument is perhaps best interpreted as 
the claim that anarchy would either be disorderly (if protection agencies cannot 
cooperate) or unstable (if they can). Caplan and Stringham (2003) respond by arguing that 
avoiding interagency war requires less cooperative efficacy than collusion since 
agreements to avoid war are self-enforcing whereas collusion is not. This gives rise to an 
anarchist “sweet spot” of intermediate interagency cooperation. Cowen and Sutter (2005) 
admit that such a sweet spot exists but argue that it will be small and thereby insist that 
orderly anarchy is unlikely. This is a slightly more complicated feasibility argument in that 
it states that depending on some uncertain conditions anarchy is either disorderly or 
unstable. 
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“without government—or even with a weak government—predatory groups 
will impose themselves on people by force and create a government to 
extract income and wealth from these subjects.” 
Cowen’s political instability: The proposed political outcome of 
statelessness is not a stable equilibrium. Even if the policy were 
implemented and would produce desirable social outcomes for as 
long as it existed, it would not exist for long. 
Some libertarians accept that neither anarchism nor minimal-state 
libertarianism is a stable equilibrium, though minimal-state libertarianism is in 
some sense more stable. In a 1995 interview with Reason magazine, for 
example, Milton Friedman makes this claim (Doherty 1995): 
Reason: Why aren’t you [a zero-government libertarian]? 
Friedman: Because I don’t think it’s a feasible social structure. I 
look over history, and outside of perhaps Iceland, where else can 
you find any historical examples of that kind of a system 
developing? 
Reason: One could argue the same thing about minimal-state 
libertarianism: that historically it seems to not be stable. 
Friedman: I agree. I wrote an article once arguing that a free society 
is an unstable equilibrium. Fundamentally, I’m of the opinion that it 
is. Though we want to try to keep that unstable equilibrium as long 
as we can! The United States from 1780 to 1929 is not a bad 
example of a limited-government libertarianism that lasted for a long 
time. 
This raises the question of just how long an institution must survive to 
be considered stable, and as with the riskiness issue considered above, the 
method of elimination does not provide a definite answer but can be used to 
make stability claims more precise. Cowen’s claim above would need to be 
reformulated in a way that specifies a time horizon. If anarchy lasted for only 
a day, it would surely be deemed unstable by any reasonable person, but 
requiring that a stateless society maintain itself for all time is an unreasonably 
high standard (Newhard 2016). To make an instability claim meaningful 
through the method of elimination, it must be reformulated in terms of the 
expected lifetime of the institution and a standard by which to judge it. As 
with riskiness, this reformulation need not make a definite prediction but 
needs to set reasonable parameters that can be debated openly.  
c) Policy accessibility  
Though it has received less attention in the academic literature than the 
other two categories of argument, a common argument in less formal debates 
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among libertarians is the extent to which anarchy is achievable as a political 
goal. This is related to arguments about gradual versus radical change and the 
relative merits of activism within or outside existing political structures, 
though it is a distinct issue. Non-anarchist libertarians will often claim that 
anarchism is an infeasible proposal because it is unlikely to come about given 
current political realities; there is no path from here to there.  
This is a feasibility argument in a sense quite different from the other 
two categories. Whereas rejecting (i) and (ii) would provide reasons against 
implementing anarchy if given a decisive choice,8 rejection of (iii) provides no 
such reason but perhaps provides a reason not to waste one’s time endorsing 
anarchism. If there is no way to bring anarchy about and we take action-
guidingness to be a hard constraint on political theory, rejection of (iii) would 
lead us to exclude statelessness from the feasible set.  
Though economists and political theorists tend to ignore in their formal 
writings the question of how to get “from here to there” in a practical sense, 
disagreements among libertarian academics on such matters are common in 
less formal settings such as dinner parties and non-academic essays. 
Holcombe’s (2007) contribution to the Cato Unbound exchange on anarchy, 
for example, makes the argument that anarchism is not within the politically 
feasible set: “I have no quarrel with people who make those arguments [that 
anarchy is desirable], but from a policy perspective they are irrelevant. 
Government will be with us for the foreseeable future, so the real policy issue 
is not whether government should be eliminated but how to make it better.” 
Holcombe sees the major barrier to implementation of anarchy in 
industrialized countries as the preferences of citizens: “American support for 
their government is the main reason why anarchy is completely infeasible 
from a policy perspective. Americans have it pretty good today, and they are 
not going to give up a reasonably comfortable status quo in exchange for an 
experiment in statelessness. So, regardless of its merits, anarchy has no 
prospect as an actual policy option. The bottom line is: in developed nations, 
most people support their government.”  
Many anarchists, such as the target of Holcombe’s remarks, Peter 
Lesson, accept that anarchy is not a feasible option in this sense but see this 
as irrelevant to their position. In response, Leeson (2007a) writes: “I have not 
                                                          
8 Some would dispute that instability is any argument against experimenting with 
anarchy. Rothbard, for example, argues that if the worst that can happen is that we get 
back to where we are, anarchy is a costless gamble that any rational person would take. As 
Cowen and Sutter and Holcombe emphasize, however, the state that re-emerges from 
anarchy could be much worse (i.e., less libertarian) than the one we abandon. 
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said anything that could be construed as identifying steps we could take to 
achieving anarchy in the U.S. Nor will I attempt to suggest how we might do 
this here. This is not because I do not think it is an important question. It is 
because I am not a political strategist, and this question of the political 
expediency of anarchy is really a question of political strategy.” Later, Leeson 
(2007b) summarizes his response to the charge of infeasibility: “The political 
feasibility of anarchy does not in any way bear on the question of anarchy’s 
superiority (or inferiority, depending upon one’s position) to government.” 
Leeson evidently does not see proposition (iii) as essential to his anarchism.9  
5. The Minimal State as Utopian 
Minarchists presumably endorse the following claims: 
(i) If implemented and maintained, the “policy outcome” of 
the minimal state is sufficiently likely to produce a situation 
in which individual rights are respected.  
(ii) If implemented, the policy outcome of a minimal state is 
sufficiently likely to be maintained (i.e., it is stable).  
(iii) A minimal state can be implemented.  
Many anarchists would reject (i) were it not for the qualification that 
the undesirability of other options is undisputed. There is little disagreement 
among libertarians on the desirability of a minimal state if that policy 
outcome can be implemented and maintained. Feasibility arguments against 
the minimal state are thus directed at propositions (ii) and (iii). As before, I 
label these “policy stability” and “policy accessibility” arguments. 
a) Policy stability 
Many anarchists (and pessimistic libertarians) see the idea that 
government can be limited to anything close to the size and scope imagined 
by minarchists as entirely fanciful. David Friedman (1989, 146–47), for 
example, concedes that a seriously restricted government capable of 
providing national defense and other public goods might be preferable to 
anarchy, but insists that no such limited government is possible: 
                                                          
9 There are some related issues here about whether it’s worthwhile advocating 
anarchy even if it’s not a feasible option. In his contribution to the Cato Unbound 
conversation, Bruce Benson (2007) claims that having an ideal end-goal in mind is useful 
in structuring evaluations of incremental steps even if we think there is no chance of the 
goal ever being fully realized. We do not discuss these issues here. 
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One cannot simply build any imaginable characteristics into a 
government; governments have their own internal dynamic. And the 
internal dynamic of limited governments is something with which 
we, to our sorrow, have a good deal of practical experience. It took 
about 150 years, starting with a Bill of Rights that reserved to the 
states and the people all powers not explicitly delegated to the 
federal government, to produce a Supreme Court willing to rule that 
growing corn to feed to your own hogs is interstate commerce and 
can therefore be regulated by Congress. 
The logic of limited governments is to grow. There are obvious reasons 
for this in the nature of government, and plenty of evidence. Constitutions 
provide, at the most, a modest and temporary restraint. As Murray Rothbard 
is supposedly said, the idea of a limited government that stays limited is truly 
Utopian. Anarchy at least might work; limited government has been tried. 
Here we seem to have a social-imperfection or political-instability claim 
as discussed above combined with the claim that we cannot be certain that 
anarchy has similar problems. Thus, we have a claim similar to but subtly 
different in form from those presented above. 
b) Policy accessibility  
Anarchists have argued that a minimal state is inaccessible in at least 
two ways: such an outcome is very unlikely or no individual has the capacity 
to bring about such an outcome. These are very different views of feasibility. 
The former is not agent relative and is essentially a probability claim. The 
latter is agent relative and more in line with Brennan and Southwood’s (2007, 
10) conception of feasibility as a “reasonable probability of success 
conditional upon trying.” Here, it is not enough that the relevant outcome 
occurs, but that the relevant individual plays a sufficient role in bringing the 
outcome about. Patri Friedman (2009) makes both types of claim in his Cato 
Unbound essay “Beyond Folk Activism.” His probability claim is that 
“libertarians are a minority, and we underperform in elections, so winning 
electoral victories is a hopeless endeavor.” Thus, given the current political 
context, a minimal state is extremely unlikely. Instead of working within the 
system, Friedman argues libertarians should find ways to “make systemic 
changes, outside entrenched power structures, that could realistically lead to a 
freer world.” For Friedman, this involves efforts to escape the power of the 
state geographically or economically. Friedman and Taylor (2010 2012) 
expand on this argument from a public choice perspective, arguing that since 
a single vote has virtually no chance of deciding an electoral outcome and 
very few people are capable of making a significant impact through political 
campaigning, the expected return of political activism is higher when working 
288 LIBERTARIAN PAPERS: VOL. 10, NO. 2 
“outside the system” to undermine or sidestep government rather than 
attempting to influence policy.  
6. Eliminating Feasibility  
As we can see from the brief discussion above, anarchists and 
minarchists have deployed a number of different feasibility claims against one 
another in political argument. Some of these are agent relative, while others 
are not. Some concern the likely effects of a political outcome, others the 
accessibility or sustainability of an outcome. Rather than attempting to fit this 
diversity into a single formulation, I argue, we should take each argument on 
its own terms to determine whether its application of terms such as 
“feasibility” and “practicality” is covering for a lack of substantive argument.  
The approach I take is the method of elimination. This was mentioned 
in passing by Richard Feynman (1969) as a way of determining whether an 
explanation of some phenomenon has been truly grasped. If an explanation 
using a scientific term such as “energy” or “gravity” cannot be rephrased in 
simpler language, then the explanation is a faulty one. Saying “Energy causes 
the car to move” does not mean anything unless the physical process through 
which this happens is to some sense understood in more basic terms. 
Chalmers (2011) introduces the method as a way of resolving philosophical 
disputes, and Bosworth (forthcoming) extends this to political argument. If 
there is disagreement on a proposition containing a vague term, the 
proposition should be capable of being rephrased until the vagueness is 
removed. If a political proposition cannot be rephrased once key terms are 
eliminated, this is proof of its nonsubstantiveness.  
If an advocate of the minimal state accuses an anarchist of advocating 
the infeasible, we should demand that they rephrase their assertion in more 
basic terms. If they are making a meaningful statement, this should be 
possible. If they are unable to rephrase their statement without using vague 
terms such as “practical” or “feasible,” the method of elimination tells us to 
reject the proposition as empty rhetoric, at least until somebody does find an 
acceptable rephrase of the argument in question. A single round of 
elimination will not resolve all disagreement, of course, but as the process is 
repeated, vagueness is reduced and the real grounds of disagreement are laid 
bare.  
Thus the claim that orderly anarchy is unstable must be rephrased as a 
claim that some specific state of affairs meets some (presumably 
comparative) threshold of probability conditional on some action or event. 
This does not resolve the disagreement, of course, but helps reveal its source. 
Do the participants disagree on what constitutes a reasonable standard of 
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feasibility or on the probabilities? If the former, we could have a 
disagreement on desirability rather than feasibility (e.g., on risk preference) or 
a merely verbal dispute. If a participant is unable to reformulate their 
argument in agreed-upon language, we either have a meaningless statement or 
an irreconcilable breakdown in political argument.  
This is not to say that the use of terms such as “feasible” is completely 
off limits, only that anyone using them should be willing to rephrase in 
simpler terms if challenged. Many uses of the concept of feasibility remain 
useful. For example, Newhard (2016, 221) argues that “the emergence of a 
single stateless pocket of effective, privately provided defense for a 
‘reasonable’ length of time is sufficient to affirm feasibility.” By defining 
“feasibility,” Newhard has in a sense pre-emptively eliminated it.10 However, 
not everyone would agree that this is an appropriate definition of 
“feasibility,” and this could lead to a debate over which definition better 
captures everyday usage or the relevant considerations for political argument. 
The method of elimination allows us to avoid this battle over definitions and 
instead focus on substantive differences in factual or normative judgements. 
7. Conclusion 
Feasibility is a crucial element of practical ethics and political theory, 
and I agree with theorists arguing that more precision and analytical rigor is 
required when making feasibility claims. I disagree, however, on the feasibility 
of constructing a general formulation of feasibility. As the above analysis has 
shown, feasibility claims take a variety of forms and are not easily reduced to 
a common formulation. Rather than defining “feasibility” as a general 
concept, I have argued that the term should be capable of being eliminated in 
political argument, with the claims deploying the concept rephrased in more 
basic terms agreed on by the parties to the argument. 
For those engaged in debates over the feasibility of anarchy and the 
minimal state, this paper has outlined a useful tool for clarifying the source of 
disagreement and enforcing substantive argument rather than empty rhetoric 
or conceptual gerrymandering (Bosworth forthcoming; Dowding and 
Bosworth forthcoming). Anarchists and minarchists often talk past one 
another when using vague terms such as “practicality” and “utopian.” A 
willingness to eliminate such loose talk and rephrase in mutually agreeable 
                                                          
10 This definition remains vague, most obviously in what constitutes a reasonable 
length of time, and these terms may also be subject to elimination if they give rise to 
confusion or disagreement. 
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language can redirect argument to the real grounds of disagreement, which 
may be empirical or normative.  
My claim that the term “feasibility” ought to be eliminated in certain 
circumstances should not be taken to mean that the concept is meaningless 
or unimportant. Rather, my claim is that, like the concept of desirability, it is 
too rich and contested to be adequately captured by a single conception 
precise enough to evaluate alternative policies or institutions. There are a 
number of concerns that can usefully be thrown in the feasibility bucket, and 
these are often closely related to one another. As the examples above have 
shown, however, there is no consensus even among libertarians on what 
policies and institutions count as feasible or infeasible. Arguments over 
definitions can obscure the real source of disagreement. To make progress, 
we should be willing to empty the bucket and consider the contents on their 
own terms. 
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